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Abstract:  We document the rise in unemployment in South Africa since the transition in 
1994.  We describe the likely causes of this increase and analyze whether the increase in 
unemployment is due to structural changes in the economy (resulting in a new 
equilibrium unemployment rate) or to negative shocks (that temporarily have increased 
unemployment.)   We conclude the former are more important.  Our analysis includes a 
multinomial logit approach to understanding transitions in individual-level changes in 
labor market status using the first nationally representative panel in South Africa.  Our 
analysis highlights several key constraints to addressing unemployment in South Africa. 
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Too many South Africans are unemployed.   Just how many are unemployed depends 
on how one defines unemployment, but even by a narrow definition, about 26 percent of 
the labor force is unemployed.  It has not always been this way.  Unemployment was 
fairly low through the 1970’s, although data limitations preclude certainty.  At the time of 
democratic transition in 1994, unemployment was substantially lower than it is today.  A 
nationally representative survey conducted just before the transition indicated that 
unemployment was 13 percent.  Another nationally representative survey in 1995 found 
unemployment to be around 15 percent.  By the end of the decade, unemployment had 
jumped to 30 percent before declining slightly.   
We structure our analysis by adopting the view that unemployment is comprised of 
two parts:  its equilibrium rate (i.e. the rate to which, all else equal, the unemployment 
series converges) and deviations from that equilibrium.  Using this construct, we ask 
whether the rise in South African unemployment represents an increase in the equilibrium 
rate or whether temporary shocks to the economy have driven unemployment above its 
equilibrium level.  In the case of the former, one should not expect to see unemployment 
return to its previous level while in the case of the latter, a halving of the current 
unemployment rate might reasonably be expected even absent much intervention. 
We rely on a decade of detailed nationally representative household surveys to inform 
our inquiry, and we place a greater emphasis on the more recent data.  Our focus on 
individual-level data, as opposed to, say, industry-level, data permit us to delve deeply 
into the microeconomic aspects of South African unemployment. 
We begin our analysis in Section 2 by documenting unemployment and the 
characteristics of the labor force in South Africa.  This section puts forth the set of facts 
that any explanation for unemployment must confront.  These facts lay the groundwork 
for our explanation of the current high unemployment rate.  We find, for example, that 
the supply of labor increased after the fall of apartheid.  In particular, there was an 
unprecedented influx of African women into the labor market.  On the whole, these new 
entrants into the labor market tended to be relatively unskilled.  At about the same time, 
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the demand for labor did not increase and, in the mining and agricultural sectors, the 
demand for labor fell.  These shrinking sectors also tended to employ relatively less-
skilled labor.  Further contributing to the decline in the demand for unskilled labor, skill-
biased technical change was occurring in South Africa (as well as the rest of the globe).  
The shrinking demand for and huge influx of relatively unskilled labor created a “perfect 
storm,” and unemployment among the less-skilled and/or less-experienced workers 
ballooned.   
Section 3 investigates the compositional changes in employment at the sectoral level 
and the accompanying trends in wages.  High-skilled workers have seen their 
employment share and their real wages increase as industries, and the economy as a 
whole, shift towards more skilled workers.  The unemployed are becoming, on average, 
less-skilled and the gap is widening between their skill level and the skill level of the 
employed.  These results have important policy implications.  For example, because the 
unemployed became ever less-skilled, and those employed yet more skilled, policies to 
transition the unemployed into the labor market face even greater hurdles. 
Section 4 moves beyond the sectoral viewpoint of section 3 and examines 
unemployment at the level of the individual.  Having documented the rather bleak picture 
of the labor market portrayed in sections 2 and 3, we next investigate why unemployment 
has persisted.  In the simplest economic models, when supply increases while demand is 
falling, we expect prices (i.e. wages) to fall to clear the market.  While there is some 
evidence that real wages fell in South Africa during the worst years of unemployment, 
the nominal decline that would have been necessary to clear the labor market was simply 
too large to be politically or socially acceptable.  Furthermore, there were institutional 
constraints that kept wages from declining as much as they otherwise might have.  We 
find, for example, a persistent union wage differential suggesting that unions are keeping 
wages higher for union members.   This is good news for employed union members, but 
it poses additional challenges to addressing the unemployment problem. 
One way in which unemployment might have been reduced would have been for 
South Africa to “inflate” its way out of the morass.  With inflation and fairly constant 
nominal wages, the real declines could, in principle, clear the market.  In the years after 
transition, however, South Africa was under intense scrutiny by the international 
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financial community and therefore kept inflation reasonably under control.  Hence, 
inflation and the resulting decline in real wages in and of itself was not a viable 
“solution” to the unemployment problem. 
Another way in which many sub-Saharan African countries often deal with rigidities 
in the formal sector labor market is through a burgeoning informal sector.  South Africa, 
though, has a relatively small informal sector relative to its African neighbors.  One 
reason this might be the case is that a spirit of entrepreneurship was actively discouraged 
for decades under apartheid.  This history may help explain why the informal sector has 
not grown as quickly as one might otherwise expect.  In section 4, we examine the role of 
the informal sector as a potential “springboard” into the formal sector.  The results are not 
entirely encouraging.  An investigation of individual-level transitions in labor market 
status shows that while some parts of the South African labor market are surprisingly 
dynamic (there is, for example, a lot of churning into and out of some types of 
employment), some transitions are rare.  These results speak to the difficulties associated 
with some types of job search as well as point to potential constraints that might be 
relaxed with policy.  For example, a vestige of apartheid is the geographic distance 
between where many of the unemployed reside and where most businesses are located.  
This makes searching for employment especially expensive and difficult, and our results 
suggest that transitions by urban Africans (who tend to live in outlying areas) from 
informal to formal sector jobs are rare. 
Discrimination is another possible explanation for the persistent unemployment.  
After decades of institutionalized racial discrimination, remnants surely persist, but the 
magnitudes are unclear and remain so despite our attempts to examine it empirically. 
While our many analyses almost always find that race matters, there are competing 
explanations for this correlation.  The difficulty in interpreting the results stems from the 
fact that for decades, race mattered in most economically-relevant aspects of South 
Africa.  Persistent unemployment of Africans could result from discrimination but it is 
also consistent with many other outcomes that are correlated with race.  For example, the 
effects of historically low investments in African education  still impact post-apartheid 
employment outcomes.  The data cannot distinguish between the observable attribute 
(race) and the many economically relevant but unobserved attributes (quality of 
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education, distance from where jobs are located, personal networks that might lead to 
employment, etc.) that are correlated with race and which impact labor market status. 
In section 4, we also examine the potential role of high reservation wages in the 
employment equation.  The State Old Age Pension system mitigates the necessity of 
employment in some households.  While the pension scheme is certainly not primarily 
responsible for unemployment, our results suggest it may contribute to the problem, 
especially for young workers.  The mechanism is one in which household-level pension 
income perhaps raises the reservation wage of some household members. On the other 
hand, work by Posel, Fairburn & Lund (2004) and Edmonds, Mammen & Miller (2003) 
shows that pension receipt facilitates the departure of prime-age women from the 
household to permit them to migrate in search of work.  The effect of the pension is really 
quite complex. 
We conclude that while there may be some elements of the recent increase in 
unemployment that result from temporary “shocks” away from the equilibrium rate, most 
of the evidence points to structural changes in the labor market that resulted from the 
dismantling of apartheid.  The evidence suggests that the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment has in fact increased, and active policy is especially necessary because the 
problem is not mostly self-correcting. 
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Section 2 
2. The Structure of Unemployment and Labor Input   
 
In this section we describe some of the key patterns in the data that motivate our 
analysis. In Table I, we present the recent data on labor force participation, employment 
and unemployment. The first question that deserves attention speaks to the definition of 
these variables. Typically, the working age population is divided into those that are in the 
labor force in a given period and those not participating in the labor market in that period. 
Those in the labor force are then further classified as being employed or unemployed. 
Official statistics in South Africa follow the international standard developed by the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) and classify working age individuals as being in 
the labor force if during a week of reference they were employed or wanted to work and 
were available to start working within a week but also had actively looked for work 
during the past four weeks. In what follows, we refer to this classification as the ILO 
definition.  We also present statistics that use an extended or broader definition of labor 
force participation and unemployment by eliminating the requirement of having actively 
searched for a job in order for an individual as to be classified as unemployed.  
Table I presents the recent trends in participation, employment and unemployment for 
the population aged 16 to 64 years. Several interesting facts emerge. First of all, 
unemployment, irrespective of the measure adopted, is extremely high, and has increased 
substantially since the African National Congress come to power after South Africa’s 
first democratic elections in 1994. Using the ILO definition, unemployment doubled 
between 1995 and 2001, going from an already high unemployment rate of 15.6 percent 
to 30.3 percent. Since then, it started to decline but it still is substantially higher than in 
1995. In 2005, we estimate unemployment to be 26.7 percent.2  
Second, labor force participation also substantially increased since the end of 
apartheid. Using the ILO definition, it increased by 6 percentage points, which, over a 
decade, represents a large shock to the labor market. Furthermore, using the broad 
definition, it increased by 10 percentage points. Finally, the employment rate decreased 
                                                 
2 Our statistics are not exactly the same as those officially published by STATS-SA since we restrict our 
estimates to the population aged 16-64 years old.  
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slightly during the same period. It went from 43.3 percent to 41.9 percent. However, it is 
likely that this reflects an unusually high employment rate for males in 1995 (see section 
2.1 below).3    
 
Table I: Participation, Employment and Unemployment Rates 
(%) 
ILO Classification  Broad Classification Year 
Participation Employment Unemployment   Participation Unemployment 
1995 51.4 43.3 15.6   60.3 28.2 
1997 48.2 37.5 22.1   60.6 38.0 
1999 55.4 41.7 24.8   69.0 39.9 
2001 59.4 41.4 30.3   72.1 42.5 
2003 56.8 40.6 28.6   70.6 42.5 
2005 57.2 41.9 26.7   71.2 41.1 
Notes: All statistics are for population 16 to 64 years old.  
Source: Authors calculations using the October Household Survey and the September wave of the Labor Force Survey. 
 
Table II presents some useful international comparisons. Clearly, South Africa 
contrasts poorly with the sample of countries presented in this table. Employment in 
South Africa is among the lowest while unemployment ranks among the highest in the 
group. Even among African countries, which tend to have lower employment rates and 
higher unemployment rates than OECD and Latin American countries, South Africa 
performs poorly. 
The very high reported unemployment in South Africa has naturally generated debate 
about its reliability. For instance, an International Labor Organization report expresses 
reservations about the unemployment estimates because earlier surveys excluded 
employed miners living in hostels from the sample. Another concern relates to 
mistakenly categorizing as unemployed those who may be involved in informal work. 
                                                 
3 A concern with the 1995 October Household Survey is that several districts in KwaZulu/Natal were not 
surveyed because they were considered too dangerous for the survey teams. The population in these areas 
was about 3 million, so the omission may be important. Survey weights were calculated to compensate for 
this problem (see Butcher and Rouse, 2001). However, the fact that these workers are not represented must 
be kept in mind when comparing later periods to 1995.  
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Nattrass (2000) reviews the evidence and concludes that there is little reason to believe 
that the official statistics are significantly wrong (see also Bhorat, 1999).4
 
Table II: International Comparisons. Participation, Employment and 
Unemployment Rates 
(%) 
Country Year Participation Employment Unemployment 
OECD Countries 
    
United States 2004 75.4 71.2 5.6 
United Kingdom 2004 76.2 72.7 4.7 
Spain 2004 69.7 62.0 11.0 
France 2004 69.3 62.4 10.0 
Greece  2004 66.5 59.6 10.4 
Poland 2004 64.2 51.9 19.3 
Latin America 2002/2004 69.5 62.6 9.8 
African Countries 
    
Botswana 2001 57.6 46.7 18.9 
Cameron 2001 64.3 57.2 11.0 
Egypt 2002 45.2 40.6 10.2 
Ethiopia 2004 65.3 50.0 23.4 
Lesotho 1997 61.9 38.4 37.9 
Mauritius 2004 63.2 57.9 8.4 
Namibia 2000 65.0 43.0 33.8 
Tunisia 2003 53.3 45.4 14.7 
Average African 








     
South Africa 2005 57.2 41.9 26.7 
Note: The statistics in this table are supposed to be comparable. We attempted to report all the African 
countries with data available for one recent year. However, we discarded a few countries with extremely 
low and extremely high participation rates.  
Source: International Labor Organization.  
 
Even if one believes that unemployment is very high in South Africa, and that it has 
increased substantially since the early 1990’s, the question remains open of what 
happened to unemployment during the 1980s when the unions became stronger. This is a 
more difficult question to tackle. On one hand, the mere fact that the apartheid regime 
imposed severe restrictions on search behavior makes estimates of unemployment rates 
for this period incomparable to the statistics gathered since the early 1990’s. On the other 
                                                 
4 Klasen and Woolard (1999) also point out that different South African household surveys give similar 
estimates of unemployment rates. 
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hand, even if one were to overlook this problem, the lack of appropriate data still makes it 
difficult to answer this question with certainty difficult.  Feinstein (2005) assembled 
census data between 1951 and 1996 in an attempt to bring together comparable estimates 
of unemployment over time. However, these series were constructed by making 
assumptions and extrapolations and are subject to large measurement error. Thus, the 
results should be interpreted with caution. In Feinstein’s data, unemployment appeared 
quite stable until 1980, when it was still estimated to be around 7 percent. The next point 
estimate presented is for 1991, when unemployment was estimated to be as high as 18 
percent.5 Seekings and Nattrass (2006) review the available evidence from different 
sources and conclude instead that unemployment has increased since the mid-1970s.6 All 
in all, it appears that unemployment grew during the mid-1970s, and continued to grow 
throughout the 1980’s until it reached the levels observed in the 1993 SALDRU survey 
(and again in the 1995 October Household survey.)   
 
Table III: Participation, Employment and Unemployment by Region 
(%) 
Urban  Rural Year 
Participation Employment Unemployment  Participation Employment Unemployment
1995 60.7 51.8 14.6  39.2 32.2 17.8 
1997 57.4 45.7 20.4  34.4 25.3 26.4 
1999 63.4 48.8 23.0  43.4 31.0 28.5 
2001 67.7 48.1 28.9  47.1 31.4 33.3 
2003 65.5 46.8 28.5  43.8 31.2 28.7 
Notes: All statistics are for population 16 to 64 years old. ILO definitions adopted. The 2005 data cannot be classified by region.  
Source: Authors calculations using the October Household Survey and the September wave of the Labor Force Survey. 
 
In Table III we present the recent trends in participation, employment and 
unemployment in urban versus rural areas. Unemployment is quite high in both 
categories. However, participation and employment are much higher in urban areas than 
in rural ones. Figure I exploits a further geographical division of the country into 53 
districts and assigns to each district the degree of urbanization by computing the 
                                                 
5 However, note that to the extent that these estimates are comparable to our household survey-based 
estimates, they are analogous to the broad definition of unemployment.   
6 During the mid-1970s several household surveys were conducted, mainly by university-based academics, 
in response to the lack of good data about unemployment. All of them reported high rates of unemployment 
among Africans by the mid-to-late 1970s (see the evidence summarized in Seekings and Nattrass, 2006).  
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proportion of people residing in urban areas within each district. Although unemployment 
decreases with urbanization, it does so only slightly. Unemployment appears to decrease 
from 30 percent in rural districts to 20 percent in urban districts.  The rate of discouraged 
workers in the labor force appears to decrease from 40 percent in rural districts to below 
10 percent in urban districts. 
One striking feature of South Africa is its low level of labor market participation and 
employment in rural areas. For example, comparing employment rates by age group and 
region between South Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean we observe that even 
though the statistics are always lower in South Africa, the differences are strikingly large 
in rural areas (see Table IV).  
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Table IV: Employment Rates by Region and Age Group 
South Africa and Latin America 
(%) 
Rural Urban
Year (15-19) (20-24) (25-34) (35-49) (50-64) (15-19) (20-24) (25-34) (35-49) (50-64)
South Africa 2004 3.9 16.5 38.3 52.3 36.3 4.0 25.3 55.4 65.8 49.4
Latin America 2000- 43.1 60.8 68.6 72.0 65.7 24.0 53.1 70.9 75.7 60.7
and the Caribbean 2004
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Household Surveys.  
 
 
Table V presents the recent trends in participation, employment and unemployment 
by gender. As it is often the case, males are more likely to participate in the labor market 
and less likely to be unemployed. Indeed, female unemployment rates are about 50 
percent higher than those for males, a figure that is not unusual relative to other labor 
markets in the world.  The table also shows that the participation gender gap narrowed 
between 1995 and 2005. 
 
Table V: Participation, Employment and Unemployment by Gender 
(%) 
Male  Female Year 
Participation Employment Unemployment  Participation Employment Unemployment
1995 62.1 54.5 12.3  41.1 32.7 20.5 
1997 57.9 47.7 17.7  39.2 28.2 28.1 
1999 63.3 50.2 20.7  48.1 33.8 29.7 
2001 66.5 48.7 26.7  53.0 34.8 34.4 
2003 64.2 47.7 25.6  50.3 34.2 31.9 
2005 65.2 50.5 22.6  49.8 34.0 31.7 
Notes: All statistics are for population 16 to 64 years old. ILO definitions adopted.  
Source: Authors calculations using the October Household Survey and the September wave of the Labor Force Survey. 
 
Table VI disaggregates these statistics by race. We use the racial categories 
constructed by the apartheid regime: African, Coloured, Indian (those of Indian origin) 
and White. Not surprisingly, a legacy of the apartheid era is that Africans have worse 
labor market outcomes than the other groups. Coloured and Indians also had worse 




Table VI: Participation, Employment and Unemployment by Race 
(%) 
African  Colored Year 
Participation Employment Unemployment  Participation Employment Unemployment
1995 45.9 36.7 20.1  64.2 55.3 13.8 
1997 43.5 31.3 28.0  60.8 50.9 16.3 
1999 51.1 35.4 30.6  67.1 56.1 16.4 
2001 56.1 35.6 36.7  67.2 52.2 22.4 
2003 53.6 35.4 34.0  65.8 51.4 21.8 
2005 54.2 36.9 31.9  65.4 52.3 20.0 
               
Indian  White Year 
Participation Employment Unemployment  Participation Employment Unemployment
1995 60.1 54.4 9.3  68.6 66.4 3.3 
1997 57.6 51.2 11.1  64.8 61.9 4.6 
1999 64.6 53.5 17.3  71.3 67.1 5.9 
2001 67.0 53.4 20.3  72.0 66.9 7.0 
2003 63.8 52.7 17.4  71.3 67.3 5.5 
2005 63.9 52.0 18.7  70.3 66.7 5.1 
Notes: All statistics are for population 16 to 64 years old. ILO definitions adopted.   
Source: Authors calculations using the October Household Survey and the September wave of the Labor Force Survey. 
 
In 1995, the labor force participation of Africans was only 45.9 percent, their 
employment rate was 36.7 percent, and their unemployment rate was 20.1 percent. All 
the other groups have participation rates above 60 percent and unemployment rates that 
are substantially lower. The unemployment rate of Coloureds was 13.8 percent, Indians 
9.3 percent and Whites 3.3 percent. Since 1995, all groups have increased their labor 
market participation, but they have not increased their employment rates – in fact 
Coloureds and Indians saw slight decreases.  All population groups experienced increased 
unemployment rates. Africans increased participation rates by approximately 10 
percentage points from 1995 to 2005 and their unemployment rate increased by about 50 
percent. Clearly, many of the new entrants to the labor market were not finding jobs.  
Coloureds and Indians increased their participation rates by only about 3 percentage 
points and yet unemployment rates about doubled.  Finally, the unemployment rate for 
Whites, while small, rose by about 50 percent. Thus, all racial groups are performing 
worse in terms of employment than they were a decade ago. 
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We turn next to labor market performance by educational attainment. We classify the 
population into four education groups: Less than matric, matric, some post-matric 
education and Tertiary education completed.  There are few surprises. Table VII shows 
that higher education is correlated with better employment outcomes and greater labor 
market participation. The largest increase in participation from 1995 to 2005 is for 
workers with a matric or less. This group also has seen its employment rate actually 
decline. The employment rate for individuals with matric decreased from 54 percent to 
49.7 percent during this period. Consequently, their unemployment rate almost doubled, 
from 15.2 percent to 28.2 percent. Even post-matric individuals are facing high 
unemployment rates. Indeed, it takes a completed university degree to mostly escape 
unemployment in South Africa.  
 
Table VII: Participation, Employment and Unemployment by Educational Level 
(%) 






t  Participation Employment Unemployment 
1995 44.8 36.6 18.4   63.7 54.0 15.2 
1997 41.3 30.8 25.4   62.5 48.7 21.9 
1999 47.8 34.6 27.7   68.8 50.4 26.7 
2001 51.8 34.4 33.6   73.3 49.7 32.3 
2003 48.4 33.1 31.6   71.2 49.2 30.9 
2005 49.2 34.2 30.4   69.2 49.7 28.2 






t  Participation Employment Unemployment 
1995 80.6 76.8 4.6   85.8 84.0 2.1 
1997 80.0 73.7 7.9   83.6 80.4 3.9 
1999 85.0 74.3 12.6   87.4 82.2 6.0 
2001 85.9 72.4 15.7   90.1 83.2 7.7 
2003 89.1 76.1 14.6   89.7 85.6 4.6 
2005 86.2 76.1 11.7   88.5 85.6 3.3 
Notes: All statistics are for population 16 to 64 years old. ILO definitions adopted. Matric are those individuals with grade 
12/standard 10/form 5/matric. Post-matric education includes those with: certificate with grade 12/std 10 and diploma with grade 
12/std 10. College includes all individuals with: bachelors degree, bachelors degree and diploma, honors degree and higher degree. 
This classification eliminates around 0.3% of the sample with vocational degrees.    
Source: Authors calculations using the October Household Survey and the September wave of the Labor Force Survey. 
 
Table VIII slices the data by age groups for the years 1995 and 2005. As expected, 
participation in the market for those below 20 years old is quite low. Still, as is typically 
the case, their unemployment rates are the highest of all age groups.  The unemployment 
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rate for those 20 to 25 years of age is twice the unemployment rate of the entire 
population.  This is true both in 1995 and 2005, implying that unemployment increased 
more for youths (82 percent) as for the whole population (72 percent). In addition, labor 
force participation increased most among those aged 16 to 29 years. 
 
Table VIII: Participation, Employment and Unemployment by Age 
(%) 
Age Participation  Employment  Unemployment 
1995 
16-64 51.4 43.3 15.6 
16-19 8.7 5.0 42.7 
20-24 38.6 26.6 31.1 
25-29 61.3 48.2 21.3 
30-34 70.2 59.6 15.1 
35-39 71.7 63.3 11.7 
40-49 69.2 63.5 8.3 
50-64 46.4 43.4 6.4 
2005 
16-64 57.2 41.9 26.7 
16-19 12.1 5.3 56.6 
20-24 47.8 22.8 52.3 
25-29 71.4 45.7 36.0 
30-34 75.8 56.1 26.0 
35-39 75.7 60.8 19.6 
40-49 72.2 61.7 14.5 
50-64 50.6 46.3 8.5 
Notes: ILO definitions adopted.  
Source: See Table I.  
 
Clearly, the composition of the labor force has changed dramatically since the end of 
apartheid. The respective shares of Africans, young people, and females increased 
considerably.  Ceteris paribus, these changes alone would have increased unemployment.  
An alternative way to view the increases in unemployment is to consider the role of 
demographic changes.  We conduct this exercise by constructing a counterfactual: we 
divide the population into 240 mutually exclusive groups based on age, sex, race, 
education and region of residence, and assume that the share of each of these groups is 
constant over time at the values of 1995.  In Figure II we present the actual 
unemployment series using ILO definition as well as the counterfactual series.  This 
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figure clearly illustrates that a large fraction of the increase in unemployment is due, 
ceteris paribus, to the change in the composition of the labor force. Indeed, we estimate 
that this accounts for 31 percent of the increase in unemployment between 1995 and 2005 
– an extremely large jump to be accounted by demographics alone in a ten-year period. 
 


































Unemployment Rates Simulated Unemployment Rates
Note: Author calculations based on OHS and LFS surveys
 
  
In Table IX we decompose the stock of individuals who were unemployed in 2005 by 
whether they have worked before or not.  Most strikingly, just under 60 percent of the 
unemployed have never worked before.  Long-term unemployment is a problem: of those 
who have worked before, 58.6 percent have been unemployed for a year or more.  This 
figure is 68.3 percent for those who have never worked.  It is important to note that youth 
unemployment is also a serious problem, as young people make up the majority of those 
who have never worked. 
 
Table IX: Unemployment by previous working status and incomplete 
duration spell 
Worked Before  Never Worked 
41.1  58.9 
< 1 year   >= 1 year  < 1 year  >= 1 year 
41.4   58.6  31.7  68.3 
Notes: ILO definitions adopted.  
Source: Authors calculations using the October Household Survey and the September wave of the 




2.1 Trends in Labor Supply  
 
There was an increase in labor force participation rates of both sexes in the late 
1990s, notably among females whose participation rate increased by 10 percentage points 
(see Figure III).  This was a substantial shock to the market.  Participation rates have 
decreased since 2000, however some of this may be due to incomparability of the OHS 
and LFS surveys.  Labor force participation increased dramatically between the end of 
apartheid and September 2000 in both urban and rural areas (see Figures IV and V).  
Since then, both urban and rural participation rates have trended downward, with rural 
rates dropping significantly more. 
 





































































































































































































































































































The main message of these figures is that the entire secular movement in 
unemployment prior to 2005 can be accounted for by changes in participation.  In Figure 
VI we present the actual unemployment series along with a counterfactual series that is 
constructed by holding the labor force participation rate constant at 1995 levels.  The 
counterfactual rate is approximately the same at the beginning and end of the period 
(1995-2005) with a rise and fall mirroring changes in participation. 
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2.2 Patterns in Labor Demand  
 
We now turn our attention to the evolution of the composition of employment in 
South Africa.  We rely on the analysis in Bhorat (2000) for trends in employment 
between 1970-1995 (using the Census of 1970 and the 1995 OHS) and extend the 
analysis using the Labor Force Surveys of September 2000 and March 2005.  The data 
show a dismal employment performance over the whole period (see Table X).  In 35 
years, total employment only increased by 57 percent, which implies an annualized 
growth rate of 1.3 percent per year.  The number of employees only increased 35.3 
percent over the same period, which implies an annualized growth rate of 0.8 percent per 
year.  Contrasting this employment growth with the fact that the population aged 14-65 
grew at 2.68 percent per year paints a clear picture of the role labor demand played in the 
unemployment problem. 
Table X: Total Employment 
Source and Year Census 1970 OHS 1995 LFS Sep 2000 LFS Mar 2005
Total Employment 7,709,476 10,151,548 11,969,273 12,107,554 
Employee  6,294,614 8,659,211 7,919,963 8,519,063 
Self Employee 572,264 795,649 3,043,059 2,734,482 
Domestic Workers 842,598 696,688 1,006,251 854,009 
     
   Unemployment 303,165 1,998,914 4,088,846 4,288,875 





3.1.1 Employment Trends by Sector and Skill Level: 1970-2005 
 
 The poor growth in total employment between 1970-2005 is associated with 
substantial structural change. The Primary sector – mainly Agriculture and Mining – was 
shedding labor throughout the period while Finance, Wholesale and Retail Sales and 
Community, Social & Personal Services increased employment (see Table XI).7  Thus, 
the sectoral composition of employment changed substantially in South Africa. 
Agriculture went from 33 percent of total employment to only 11 percent while 
Wholesale and Retail Sales increased from 9 to 25 percent, and employment in the 
financial sector also increased: from 3 to 11 percent. This altered the composition of 
employment in terms of educational attainment, favoring more skilled workers (see Table 
XII). It also appears plausible that displaced workers from agriculture and mining were 
unable to relocate to other regions where jobs might be available, which could be why 
there are so many discouraged workers in rural areas.  
 
Table XI: Evolution of relative employment by industry (%) 







2000 2005   
Employees   
Industry 1970 1995 2000 2005
Agriculture 33 14 17 11   Agriculture 33 14 10 8 
Mining 9 5 5 4   Mining 9 6 7 5 
Manufacturing 14 16 15 15   Manufacturing 14 17 17 17 
Utilities 1 1 1 1   Utilities 1 1 1 1 
Construction 6 5 6 7   Construction 6 5 6 8 
Wholesale & Retail 9 19 23 25   Wholesale & Retail 9 17 18 19 
Transport  4 6 5 5   Transport  4 6 6 6 
Finance  3 7 9 11   Finance  3 7 11 11 
Community 21 26 19 21   Community 21 28 24 24 
Note: Domestic workers are excluded. 






                                                 
7 In this section we adopt the same educational classification as Bhorat (2000). Individuals who earned a 
diploma or a certificate are considered as having tertiary education. 
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Table XII: Evolution of relative employment by education level (%) 
Total Employment  
Education Level 1970 1995 2000 2005   
Employees 
Education Level  1970 1995 2000 2005
None 38 7 7 5   None 38 7 5 4
Some Primary 31 20 24 18   Some Primary 31 21 20 17
Some Secondary 23 31 30 29   Some Secondary 23 31 30 29
Complete Secondary 6 24 21 29   Complete Secondary 6 24 24 31
Tertiary 1 17 18 18   Tertiary 1 17 21 19
Sources: Census 1970, OHS 1995 and LFS September 2000 and March 2005 
 
Following the methodology of Katz and Murphy (1992), we look at how the skill 
composition of the labor force has changed within each sector and in the economy 
overall.  The within sector shifts capture how the relative shares of employment by skill 
level have changed within sectors over time (holding total industry employment fixed).  
The between sector shifts measure how the skill composition of the economy changes 
when sectors that are more intensive in, say, high-skill workers, expand or contract, either 
gaining or shedding employees.  Table XIII presents the results in percentage points of 
total employment. 
 
Table XIII: Educational Decomposition into Between Industry and Within Industry Shifts. 
Total Employment 
(% of Total Employment in Economy) 
1970-1995 Between Within Total Within% 1995-2000 Between Within Total Within%
None -10.84 -20.01 -30.85 64.86  None 0.67 -0.57 0.10 45.81
Some Primary -0.42 -10.35 -10.77 96.10  Some Primary 1.21 2.00 3.21 62.37
Some Secondary 7.26 0.27 7.53 3.62  Some Secondary 0.29 -1.10 -0.82 79.25
Complete Secondary 3.52 14.58 18.11 80.54  Complete Secondary -0.39 -2.87 -3.27 87.94
Tertiary 0.48 15.50 15.98 97.00  Tertiary -1.78 2.55 0.77 58.90
           
2000-2005 Between Within Total Within% 1970-2005 Between Within Total Within%
None -1.07 -1.33 -2.40 55.33  None -13.43 -19.72 -33.14 59.48
Some Primary -1.70 -3.37 -5.07 66.40  Some Primary -1.41 -11.21 -12.62 88.82
Some Secondary 0.06 -0.90 -0.84 93.47  Some Secondary 9.25 -3.38 5.87 26.77
Complete Secondary 1.24 6.74 7.97 84.47  Complete Secondary 5.00 17.82 22.81 78.10





The structural shift of employment from the primary sector to the tertiary sector 
accounts for the large decrease in employment of the lowest-skill workers and for the 
increase in the share of individuals with at least some secondary education.  These 
between-industry shifts are particularly important prior to 1995.  Table XIII suggests that 
within-industry shifts account for most of the dramatic decrease in the employment of 
least educated individuals (with less than a completed secondary education) since 1995. 
 
3.1.2 Wages and Quantities by Educational Attainment 
 
 
We construct a relative wage index (by educational attainment) for full-time 
employees using the OHS data (1995-1999) and LFS data (2000-2005).  In each year, the 
population was divided in distinct cells according to gender, age, schooling and race. For 
each cell we computed a wage and a quantity measure. The wage measure is the average 
hourly wage by cell while the quantity measure is the cumulative sum of total hours 
worked by cell. This quantity measure was normalized to sum one in each year.  
Using these cells wages we then compute a wage index for the whole economy that is 
insensitive to composition effects. We use this wage index to deflate nominal wages and 
to obtain a measure of relative wages for each cell. Finally, the average of this relative 
wage over the whole period is used to aggregate quantities in efficiency units. 
We divide workers in three skill groups according to their educational attainment, 
using the same categories as in the previous section.  Unskilled workers are those who 
have not completed secondary education, Semi-Skilled workers include those who have 
complete secondary education and Skilled are those with tertiary studies. For each skill 
group we computed average hourly wages, which were deflated using the wage index, 
and total hours worked in efficiency units. These measures are presented in Figure VII. 
The contraction in total employment during the late 1990s is evident in the left panel 
of Figure VII from the decline of total hours worked (in efficiency units), especially by 
skilled workers.  Relative wages for skilled workers increased slightly while relative 
wages for unskilled workers were stable over this period.  These results are robust to 




Figure VII: Wages and Quantities 
 






























3.2 The Evolution of Wages 
 
 It is safe to say that average real wages in South Africa have been stable or decreased 
slightly between 1995-2005.  We estimate that real wages decreased by approximately 10 
percent during this time, as a result of a decline from 1995-1998 and a recovery at the end 
of the period (see Figure VIII).  Burger and Yu (2006) estimate a rise of 4 percent over 
the same period.  Our estimates might overestimate the drop in wages near the beginning 
of the series, while their estimates might overestimate the growth rate in the later years, 
so the true real wage adjustment is bounded by our estimates.8  This is consistent with 
results in Hoogeveen and Ozler (2005), who find that per capita growth of household 
expenditures only grew 0.5 percent between 1995-2000.9  
                                                 
8 We follow Burger and Yu (2006) in two methodological decisions.  The efficiency with which the OHS 
captures informal low-wage workers has increased over time, which implies that earlier surveys 
overestimated real wages.  Thus we consider only full-time employees to exclude most informal salaried 
workers that were captured differentially in the early surveys.  We also drop extremely high wage 
observations that are likely the result of coding errors. 
9 Our series matches the patterns in consumption of durable goods that exhibit a U-shape with its lowest 
value in 1999. 
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Log of Hourly Real Wages
  
 The trends in average real wages hide the evolution of a composition effect: while 
the real wages of most groups declined, the share of high-income workers increased 
during this period, propping up the average real wage.  We examine real wages of full-
time salaried workers by age group and educational attainment (see Figure IX).  Real 
wages for workers under 30 rose slightly between 1995-2005, while real wages for 
workers over 30 fell.  Workers without a college degree have lost close to 20 percent of 
their real wage (see the bottom two sets of panels in Figure IX).  This finding is 
consistent with Leibbrandt et al. (2005), who find that the decline in real individual 
income is attributable to the decline in returns to individual endowments (attributes).  
 We examine the evolution of relative wages using a series of repeated cross-section 
earning equations for salaried workers.  Figure X presents results using monthly earnings 
(left panel) and hourly earnings (right panel), and conditioning on educational dummies 
(same four categories as in Table VII), experience, experience-squared, gender and race 
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Age Categories: HS1=16 to 29 ; HS2=29 to 44 ; HS3 = 45 to 64
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Age Categories: SS1=16 to 29 ; SS2=29 to 44 ; SS3 = 45 to 64
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Age Categories: US1=16to28 ; US2=29to44 ; US3 = 45to64
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Incomp. Sec. Matric Post-Matric University



































Incomp. Sec. Matric Post-Matric University
Note: Primary incomplete or less as ommited category
16 to 64
Education Returns
Note: left panel uses monthly total income and right panel uses hourly income.  
 
There is evidence of a rise in the return to education for those with education beyond 
matric, and a decline in returns for those with a matric or less.  These patterns are 
consistent with an increase in the demand for skilled labor and with an increase in the 
supply of labor, especially matric holders, as discussed above.  The other striking fact 
about wages is that Africans seem to be falling behind (see Figure XI).  The race 
indicator variable may be increasingly picking up unobserved differences in the quality of 
education as education levels between Africans and others converge.  
 










































































3.2.1  Labor unions 
 
 Labor unions have an important role in determining the evolution of wages because 
of their sizeable membership and substantial economic and political force in South 
Africa.  The relationship between the union wage premium and labor productivity will 
have ramifications for unemployment.  According to surveys by the Bureau of Market 
Research, 2.5 percent of African workers in urban areas of South Africa were unionized 
in 1975, 5.5 percent by 1980, and after officially legalizing African unions in the early 
1980s, 19 percent were by 1985 (Moll, 1993). The Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) estimates that the rate of unionization grew to 37 percent in 1993 
(Schultz and Mwabu, 1997).  
 In Table XIV we present the share of employees that were union members in 1993, 
1995, 1998 and 2004. The share of employees that were union members appears to have 
been stable since 1993.  Unionization rates are highest in mining, manufacturing, 
electricity and water and educational, medical and legal services. In most sectors, 
unionization rates are higher for Africans than for whites (see Schultz and Mwabu, 1997).  
 
Table XIV: Share of employees that are union members 
Industrial Sector 1993 Oct. 1995 Oct. 1998 Sep. 2000 Feb. 2004 
Agriculture 4.5 6.9 9.5 8.7 6.7 
Mining 73.1 70.7 72.9 70.0 78.5 
Manufacturing 48.0 45.7 45.6 41.5 40.2 
Electricity and Water 36.8 41.6 41.7 36.0 32.3 
Construction 23.5 18.5 15.0 12.1 10.9 
Wholesale, Retail, Hotel and 
Restaurants 
26.4 
23.7 22.7 18.3 19.1 
Transport, Communication and Finance 29.8 30.8 30.0 23.8 23.6 
Educational, Medical and Legal 30.4 45.2 60.2 63.2 62.0 
Domestic and other Services 12.0 12.8 7.8 5.6 7.1 
      
All Industries 29.8 33.2 32.8 29.6 29.6 
Source: for 1993, Schultz and Mwabu (1997) based on 1993 LSMS dataset. For 1995, 1998 and 2004, own 
elaboration based on the OHS and LFS.  
 
One could imagine that the presence of so many unionized workers might drive up 
wages faster than productivity growth, thereby exacerbating unemployment. This is 
especially a problem because collective agreements reached by bargaining councils in 
South Africa can be extended to all workers and to all firms in an industry, even if they 
 26
were not parties to the negotiations (see Bendix, 2003). Bargaining council agreements 
cover about 25 percent of formal sector employees (Godfrey, Maree and Theron., 2006).  
Here we will look mainly at the wages of unionized workers over time in South 
Africa.  Because collective bargained wages might be extended to the non-union workers, 
our estimates might only capture part of the effect of unions on competitive wages. For 
1995, Butcher and Rouse (2001) provide an estimate of the effect of unions on non-
unionized workers in sectors with industrial councils on the order of 10 percent while the 
union-wage premium they estimate it is about 20 percent.  
We estimated the following set of regressions in order to analyze the evolution of the 
union wage premium for male salaried employees from 1995 to 2004. We used data from 
OHS 1995 and 1998, LFS September 2000 and LFS February 2004. Each regression is 
estimated for all full-time male employees and for African full-time male employees.  
In the first column of Table XV we report a baseline model where we condition on a 
full set of education, race, age, industry and occupation dummies. We also included 
province dummies interacted with an urban/rural dummy. This set of controls is included 
in every regression presented in this section. In column 2, following Butcher and Rouse 
(2001), we include household fixed effects in the model. Thus, the union/non-union gap 
is identified only through households with more than one full time male employee so as 
to introduce intrahousehold variability in union status. Column 3 presents the estimate of 
adding a public sector dummy to our baseline specification in Column 1. In Column 4 we 
augment the specification of Column 3 with tenure and tenure squared in the actual job as 
control variables. Finally, in Column 5 we report an estimate of the union wage gap by 
the method of stratified matching using the controls in Column 4 to estimate the 
propensity score.  
These estimates consistently show that the estimated union wage premium increased 
during this period. The maximum premium seems to have occurred in 2000 – the same 
time as when employment dampened and wages were at their lowest levels.  In 1995, we 
estimate the union wage gap for all males to be around 13 percent (see column 5, our 
preferred specification in terms of controlling for observable variables) and 14 percent for 
African males. 
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 Year Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t Coef. t 
Africans        
 1995 0.21 14.92 0.11 2.15 - - 0.18 12.87 0.14 7.61
 1998 0.29 12.38 0.35 3.89 - - 0.25 10.38 0.20 6.97
 2000 0.42 23.11 0.37 4.86 0.39 20.92 0.33 17.63 0.27 11.38
 2004 0.41 21.95 0.47 5.40 0.37 19.28 0.33 17.13 0.23 6.92
            
All        
 1995 0.19 17.65 0.19 5.09 - - 0.16 14.56 0.13 8.46
 1998 0.27 13.75 0.33 4.71 - - 0.23 11.42 0.18 6.81
 2000 0.38 25.03 0.43 7.19 0.34 22.00 0.29 18.96 0.25 11.00
 2004 0.35 22.88 0.52 8.11 0.31 19.96 0.27 17.41 0.17 5.73
Note: The public sector dummy is not available for 1995 and 1998.  
 
 
It seems plausible that the wage premium differed among the different levels of 
education. Therefore, we repeated the estimation of the equation shown in column four of 
Table XV including interactions between the union dummy and the education level. High 
education individuals have tertiary education, medium education includes matric and post 
matric education and the less education category has less than matric. The results are 
shown in Table XVI. Moreover, it also seems possible that the union wage premium 
differed between the public and the private sector employees. Table XVI also reports the 
results for the interacted public sector and union dummies. 
The results show that the wage premium for unskilled and semi-skilled workers 
increased over time but decreased for the skilled workers. The public and private sector 
union wage premiums have commensurate values; however, there seems to be an 






Table XVI: Estimated Coefficients – Interacted Union Wage Premium 
  OLS – Union interacted with skill level OLS – Union interacted with public sector 
  High Ed. Medium Ed. Low Ed. Union x Public 
Union x 
Private Public 
 Year Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. T Coef. t 
      
Africans 1995 0.21 12.43 0.15 5.37 -0.05 -0.58 - - - - - - 
 1998 0.26 9.45 0.26 5.69 -0.28 -1.49 - - - - - - 
 2000 0.36 17.08 0.28 8.30 -0.08 -0.80 0.39 11.20 0.38 18.04 0.28 8.78
 2004 0.37 16.08 0.33 10.95 -0.35 -3.92 0.34 8.77 0.38 17.32 0.44 10.64
              
      
All 1995 0.19 14.21 0.12 6.76 -0.04 -0.71 - - - - - - 
 1998 0.24 10.46 0.21 6.27 -0.04 -0.38 - - - - - - 
 2000 0.35 19.44 0.22 8.47 -0.10 -1.76 0.33 11.19 0.35 19.23 0.28 10.08




3.2.2 Wage Push 
Prima facie, given that real wages have been falling in South Africa for most of the 
last decade and more, it is slightly odd to be discussing the possibility of unemployment 
being driven by a wage push. In particular, as we saw in section 3.2 above, the fall in 
wages was faster among the relatively lower skilled and the young, the two groups that 
suffered disproportionately from unemployment.  However, what people seem to have in 
mind when they think of wage push in South Africa is wage push in the formal sector, 
where unions are powerful and minimum wage laws may be especially binding.10 This 
can create job losses in the formal sector, increasing the demand for informal sector jobs. 
Some friction/rigidity in the informal sector then turns this increase in demand into 
unemployment. 
We repeat the analysis presented in Figure IX, restricting the sample to unionized 
workers in Figure XII.  While average wages for all workers did not increase between 
1995 and 2005 (see Figure IX), the real wages of the unionized skilled workers trended 
upwards and wages of the unskilled workers fell, at least until early 2004. Yet these are 
exactly the categories where unemployment has grown the most. In other words, the 
growing union wage premium, especially for African workers (who tend to be unskilled), 
                                                 
10 However, as argued below, minimum wage laws do play a role outside the formal sector, and the overall 
decline in real wages, especially at the bottom, happened in spite of attempts to raise the minimum wage. 
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kept the wages of the unionized unskilled from falling as fast as they otherwise would 
have (given what was happening outside the unionized sector). Naturally, the fact that the 
wages of unskilled unionized workers did not fall when the shocks in the labor market 
required them to go down indicates that unions play an important role in determining the 





4. Evidence on the Speed of Transitions 
 
Policy interventions to address the unemployment problem can be better targeted if 
we know who is unemployed and what determines transitions into and out of the labor 
force.  We disaggregate the unemployment data presented in Section 2, and examine 
transition rates by age, race and education.  One might expect that the relatively stable 
unemployment rate since 2000 reflects structural inefficiencies in the labor market that 
hinder transition.  However when we look directly at transitions it becomes clear that this 
stability hides large gross flows between employment categories. 
For this analysis, we use newly constructed panel data comprised of matched LFS 
waves.  The LFS panel is the first nationally-representative panel data on employment in 
South Africa it follows individuals over time and permits us to directly observe 
employment transition.  A more complete description of the panel is found in Appendix 
A.   
Our analysis is structured as follows: first, we determine who is in each employment 
status category; second, we examine who is transitioning between employment 
categories; third, we use multinomial logit regression analysis to identify the factors that 
make an individual more or less likely to transition out of the unemployment pool.  We 
then discuss the role played by search costs and reservation wages in transition rates. 
 
4.1.1  A snapshot of employment status 
First, we look at the factors that determine the employment status of workers in a 
particular period (September 2002, wave 6), controlling for gender, race, age, education 
level, urban/rural and whether the individual has held a job before (see Table XVII).11  
These results augment the tables given in Section 2, because here we examine conditional 
probabilities.  There are few surprises, and we discuss only the main points that emerge 
                                                 
11 The table presents mean derivatives instead of coefficients because in a multinomial logit analysis the 
derivatives contain more useful information (the sign and magnitude of the effect) than the coefficients.  
The mean derivatives are a more consistent estimator of the marginal effects than are derivatives evaluated 
at the mean.  Significance levels are taken from the test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient from the 
multinomial logistic regression is equal to zero.  The standard errors on the mean derivatives are 
uninformative regarding significance and thus are omitted from the table. 
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from the analysis.  Urban residents are more likely to be unemployed or in the formal 
sector, and less likely to be in the informal sector than are rural residents, controlling for 
covariates.  The informal sector is overwhelmingly African and female, which likely 
reflects the proportion of the informal sector made up by domestic workers.  The 
coefficients on the indicator variables for race demonstrate that Africans (the reference 
group) are more likely to be unemployed or in the informal sector than the other 
population groups, and less likely to be in the formal sector or NEA.   
 
Table XVII 
Multinomial results for employment status in wave 6, (men & women) 
Table presents mean derivatives (i.e. the average marginal 
effect)   
 NEA  Unemployed Informal  Formal 
urban -0.022 *** 0.040 *** -0.032 *** 0.015 
female 0.064 *** 0.017 *** 0.064 *** -0.145 
neverworked 0.337  0.351 *** -0.216  -0.472 
white 0.055 *** -0.060 *** -0.085 *** 0.090 
indian 0.147 *** -0.138 *** -0.096 *** 0.087 
coloured 0.213  -0.237 *** -0.083 *** 0.108 
age -0.029 *** 0.023  -0.006 *** 0.012 
age^2 0.043 *** -0.036  0.007 *** -0.015 
primary -0.008 *** 0.011 *** -0.004 *** 0.001 
secondary -0.002 *** -0.011 *** -0.009 *** 0.022 
matric -0.062 *** 0.010 *** -0.036 *** 0.087 
postmatric 0.044 *** -0.112 *** -0.081 *** 0.148 
        
Note: province dummies were included, but results not shown   
Note: Coefficients for Formal (the reference group) are for illustrative purposes 
only 
 
Holding a matric is by no means a guarantee of employment.  Although matric 
holders are more likely to be employed in the formal sector and less likely to be in the 
informal sector than are workers who have less than a matric, they are also 1 percentage 
point more likely to be unemployed.  In fact, a large portion of the unemployed have yet 
to find their first job and enter the labor force: individuals who have never before held a 
job are 35 percentage points more likely to be unemployed than are workers who have 
worked before.  This highlights the importance of obtaining that first job and suggests a 
focus for policy intervention.  This result is likely a combination of sorting by the labor 
market and the glut of matric holders driving down returns to a matric.  The result is also 
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consistent with a story in which there is a mismatch between the skills being taught in 
schools and the skills needed in the workplace.  On the other hand, having at least some 
education beyond the matric is good insurance against poor labor market outcomes.  
Those with post-matric education are 11 percentage points less likely to be unemployed 
and 8 percentage points less likely to be in the informal sector, which has lower returns to 
education than the formal sector (results not shown). 
 
4.1.2  Transition matrices 
 
The LFS panel data allow us to look at the experience of individuals over time to 
determine who is making employment transitions and how large the gross flows actually 
are.  Table XVIII presents transition matrices for several slices of the data for the six-
month period between September 2002 (wave 6) and March 2003 (wave 7).  These 
transition matrices for wave 6 to wave 7 are broadly representative of the other wave-to-
wave transitions in the panel.  Transitions matrices for a one-year period were generally 
similar as well.  For brevity we do not present these results here.  The top panel of Table 
XVIII presents transition probabilities for all adults, ages 16-64 inclusive. That matrix 
shows, for example, that: 
• Of adults 16-64 who are unemployed (and either discouraged or searching), 9.6 
percent find employment in the formal or informal sector after six months.  
• Discouraged workers most frequently transition into actively searching for work.  
About 14 percent transition from discouraged and reportedly not searching for 
work, to employed six months later.   
• Discouraged workers are twice as likely to transition into the informal than the 
formal sector, while the unemployed who are searching are equally likely to 
transition into the informal or formal sectors.  Almost 12 percent of those who are 
initially working in the informal sector transition within six months to the formal 
sector.   
• Of those with formal sector employment, only 16 percent have transitioned into 
another state after six months with the other 84 percent staying in the formal 
sector. 
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• So-called retirement is apparently not a permanent (absorbing) state. Of those 
who are retired in wave 6, only about 68 percent are classified as retired six 
months later.  This is perhaps an artifact of how data were recorded, since another 
16 percent were classified as NEA six months later.  Even if all the NEA were in 
fact still retired, there are 15 percent of the so-called “retired” who are either 




State wave 6 N Retired NEA Unemp_d Unemp_s Informal Formal Total
Retired 1,065 68.45 16.32 3.09 1.96 7.32 2.85 100
NEA 7,057 2.87 68.01 9.26 12.11 4.29 3.45 100
Unemp_d 2,264 1.91 19.09 36.11 28.78 9.89 4.22 100
Unemp_s 3,630 0.83 14.15 16.41 49.82 9.27 9.53 100
Informal 2,496 3.16 12.04 8.13 12.96 51.86 11.86 100
Formal 6,677 0.92 3.36 1.63 5.04 4.79 84.26 100
Total 23,189 4.68 26.87 10.82 17.94 11.28 28.4 100
Male adults (16-64)
State wave 6 N Retired NEA Unemp_d Unemp_s Informal Formal Total
Retired 311 64.4 13.02 5.02 3.5 7.56 6.5 100
NEA 2,926 1.8 74.37 6.81 11.24 2.66 3.12 100
Unemp_d 792 2.74 15.99 30.81 33.46 10.56 6.43 100
Unemp_s 1,573 1.25 12.33 13.81 51.05 10.31 11.25 100
Informal 919 2.42 8.89 6.83 16.75 48.65 16.46 100
Formal 3,929 0.77 1.92 1.62 6.14 4.92 84.63 100
Total 10,450 3.21 24.44 7.97 17.92 10.1 36.36 100
Female adults (16-64)
State wave 6 N Retired NEA Unemp_d Unemp_s Informal Formal Total
Retired 754 70.23 17.78 2.25 1.29 7.21 1.24 100
NEA 4,131 3.65 63.42 11.03 12.74 5.46 3.69 100
Unemp_d 1,472 1.45 20.81 39.06 26.17 9.52 2.98 100
Unemp_s 2,057 0.49 15.59 18.46 48.85 8.45 8.17 100
Informal 1,577 3.69 14.29 9.06 10.24 54.15 8.57 100
Formal 2,748 1.16 5.59 1.64 3.33 4.59 83.69 100






Most importantly, we are struck by just how much churning there appears to be in the 
labor market.  Although the aggregate unemployment figures in Table I show little 
change from LFS wave to wave, the individual-level data show remarkable mobility.  
Examples include: 
 
• Only about half of the workers who are employed in the informal sector are still 
employed there six months later. 
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• Half of the workers who are listed as formally searching for a job are still 
searching six months later. 
• Only about a third of the workers who list themselves as discouraged are so listed 
six months later.   
• Even among the NEA, about 30 percent no longer report being in that category 
after six months.   
 
Rather than a sclerotic labor market where individuals tend to stay in the same 
employment category from wave to wave, the transition data suggest a high level of 
mobility at the individual level. One concern that we had is that this reflects the burden of 
HIV/AIDS. Perhaps people are forced to transition out of the labor market when they get 
very sick and return when they are in remission. This does not appear to be the case.  We 
can use the LFS data to identify those who changed the labor market status because of 
their own illness. The results remain qualitatively similar when we leave them out: only 
the percentage of workers listed as retired or NEA change slightly.12
We examined the difference in transition rates out of formal employment for those 
who report being a member of a union compared to those who don’t.  Between wave 6 
and wave 7, just under 10 percent of unionized workers (n = 2658) transition out of the 
formal sector, while 20 percent of non-unionized workers (n = 20,531) make the same 
transition.  Even though the unionized have a slower transition rate than the non-
unionized, 10 percent is very high considering it is over a six month period.  Results are 
similar when we control for observed characteristics: union workers are 11 percentage 
points more likely to remain in the formal sector (multinomial logit results not shown). 
There is no clear pattern of transition from the informal sector to the formal sector, as 
is observed in many other developing countries.  For both men and women, an equal 
proportion transition from the informal sector into unemployed and searching as 
transition into the formal sector.  However, men transition into the formal sector at a 
higher rate (16.5 percent) than women do (8.5 percent).  Multinomial logit analysis of the 
probability of transition into the formal sector (conditioning on observable 
                                                 
12 One caveat is that the data do not allow us to identify individuals who transition because they are caring 
for family members ill with AIDS. 
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characteristics) reveals little additional information, suggesting that unobservable 
characteristics such as quality of education or access to personal networks play a role in 
finding a job (results not shown). 
If we examine the inflow into the formal sector (between waves 6 and 7), we find that 
84 percent were in the formal sector the wave before, with approximately equal inflows 
from the informal sector (4.5 percent) and unemployed who are searching (5 percent), 
and negligible inflows from the other employment categories (See Table XIX below).  
This raises questions about the nature of job search, the nature of informal employment 
and the pathways to a formal sector job.  What is it about informal sector employment 
that increases formal job finding rates to the level of job searching (as a primary 
activity)?  It may be that those who are searching or in the informal sector live or are able 
to travel to where the jobs are.  It also may be that workers recognize that the informal 
sector is sub-optimal, and for many “informal employment” is actually informal 
employment plus job search. 
It is worth noting that there are similar inflows and outflows between the formal 
sector and each of the other employment categories, percentage-wise.  This indicates that 
the labor market is close to its steady state.  However, these unconditional transition 












Total 100  
 
Table XX gives transition probabilities for South African youth (ages 16-24 
inclusive).  We identify two reasons for high unemployment rates among young people:  
low outflows because searching is not very successful, and high inflows because, for 
 36
example, high school drop-outs go directly into unemployment and are likely to remain 
there.  Those between the ages of 16-24 who are searching for a job are much more likely 
to transition into discouraged worker status than they are to obtain employment (in the 
formal or informal sector).  Of the youth classified as NEA in wave 6 (most of whom are 
students), about 22 percent transition out of NEA within six months: 18.5 percent into 
unemployment and only 3 percent into employment.  One policy response to this 
situation is for the government to induce firms to create special low wage jobs for 
younger workers. Such an institutional arrangement does exist in South Africa (it is 
called a learnership) and it is in fact subsidized. A careful analysis of this existing 
program, in light of the persistent unemployment concentrated among the younger 




Men and women State wave 7
State wave 6 N NEA Unemp_d Unemp_s Informal Formal Total
NEA 4,318 78.23 7.51 11.11 1.73 1.43 100
Unemp_d 722 21.79 37.27 31.89 6.03 3.02 100
Unemp_s 1,062 18.54 16.91 52.29 4.74 7.53 100
Informal 213 31.51 14.6 17.72 27.77 8.41 100
Formal 512 5.23 6.26 13.8 3.63 71.08 100
Total 6,827 53.91 12.8 21.08 3.82 8.39 100
Men only (16-24) State wave 7
State wave 6 N NEA Unemp_d Unemp_s Informal Formal Total
NEA 2,223 80.58 6.39 9.66 1.79 1.58 100
Unemp_d 293 20.41 27.65 40.18 6.21 5.54 100
Unemp_s 511 16.64 13.31 54.93 7.01 8.11 100
Informal 119 26.12 10.45 23.21 31.26 8.96 100
Formal 281 4.67 6.79 17.33 4.46 66.75 100
Total 3,427 55.67 9.66 21.11 4.49 9.07 100
Women only (16-24) State wave 7
State wave 6 N NEA Unemp_d Unemp_s Informal Formal Total
NEA 2,095 75.65 8.74 12.69 1.65 1.27 100
Unemp_d 429 22.66 43.4 26.61 5.91 1.42 100
Unemp_s 551 20.31 20.29 49.81 2.61 6.97 100
Informal 94 39.15 20.47 9.95 22.82 7.62 100
Formal 231 5.98 5.57 9.14 2.53 76.78 100
Total 3,400 52.12 16 21.06 3.13 7.69 100
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The retention rate in the informal sector is low among youth (28 percent) suggesting 
that this is likely casual (temporary) employment rather than a more permanent 
attachment to the informal sector.  Only about 8.5 percent of youth in the informal sector 
transition into the formal sector between waves 6 and 7.  They are less likely to transition 
into the formal sector than they are to transition into any other employment category. 
These analyses of youth transition probabilities all point to the potential benefits of 
getting young workers into their first job.  The school-to-work transition is key and it 
simply is not working at present.  As noted in the introduction, this could be because of 
search costs, because of reservation wages, or because of a mismatch between the skills 
taught in school and those required in the labor market.  These explanations are discussed 
below in sections 4.3 and 4.4. 
 Table XXI presents the transition matrices for all adults (ages 16-64) by education 
level.  Not surprisingly, those with more education have better employment outcomes, 
both in terms of transitions and retention.  Having education beyond the matric increases 
the probability that an individual will retain formal sector employment after six months 
from 83 percent to 92 percent, and reduces the probability of transition into 
unemployment if formal sector employment is not retained.  Even controlling for other 
observables, post-matric qualifications increase the probability of remaining in the formal 
sector by 7 percentage points (multinomial logit, results not shown).  Workers in the 
formal sector with a matric or less have about an 8 percent chance of transition into 
unemployment over a six-month period, compared to less than 2 percent if the worker has 
more than a matric.  Having a job in the formal sector is one thing, and, apparently, 
keeping it is quite another.  
The nature of retirement differs depending on the education level of the retiree.  As 
mentioned above, retirement is not an absorbing state, especially for the many retirees 
who have less than a matric.  The few retirees in our sample with post-matric education 
are much more likely to remain retired: six months later 82 percent of these are still 
classified as retired. 
Informal sector employment is vastly more important for individuals with a matric or 
less than it is for those with more than a matric.  In our sample, 13 percent of adults with 
less than a matric are in the informal sector compared to 3 percent for those with post-
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matric education.  Additionally, tenure in the informal sector decreases with education: 
the probability of remaining in the informal sector is 54 percent with less than a matric, 
40 percent with only a matric, and only 23 percent with more than a matric. 
 
Table XXI 
Adults 16-64 with degree or postmatric State wave 7
State wave 6 N Retired NEA U/E disc U/E search Informal Formal Total
retired 66 82.49 7.39 0.52 0 1.44 8.15 100
NEA (broad definition 142 3.16 55.34 5.04 20.41 2.6 13.45 100
u/e discouraged 44 2.59 3.65 24.29 60.12 3.18 6.17 100
u/e searching 151 1.28 8.93 11.47 56.85 6.77 14.71 100
informal employed 61 3.1 7.74 2.65 4.38 23.03 59.08 100
formal employed 1,253 0.92 2.99 0.59 1.32 1.92 92.25 100
Total 1,717 4.92 7.76 2.47 8.77 3.08 73.01 100
Adults 16-64 with matric only State wave 7
State wave 6 N Retired NEA U/E disc U/E search Informal Formal Total
retired 59 63.69 20.09 3.95 0 6.54 5.74 100
NEA (broad definition 676 2 52.71 10.07 24.35 4.27 6.6 100
u/e discouraged 379 1.01 12.23 38.54 36.01 5.07 7.13 100
u/e searching 887 0.1 14.57 15.03 54.19 6.32 9.79 100
informal employed 234 0 8.98 6 20.43 40.45 24.15 100
formal employed 1,438 1.05 3.99 1.35 6.24 4.12 83.25 100
Total 3,673 1.87 16.38 10.49 25.2 7.35 38.72 100
Adults 16-64 with less than a matric State wave 7
State wave 6 N Retired NEA U/E disc U/E search Informal Formal Total
retired 940 67.42 16.93 3.28 2.3 7.95 2.13 100
NEA (broad definition 6,239 2.97 70.04 9.27 10.53 4.33 2.86 100
u/e discouraged 1,841 2.08 20.79 35.89 26.66 11 3.6 100
u/e searching 2,592 1.05 14.27 17.14 47.96 10.41 9.17 100
informal employed 2,201 3.54 12.52 8.53 12.29 54 9.12 100
formal employed 3,986 0.88 3.23 2.11 5.89 6.1 81.79 100
Total 17,799 5.28 31.18 11.76 17.28 13.01 21.49 100
 
 Table XXII presents labor market transitions by population group.  Outcomes for 
African workers are generally worse than for the other population groups: they are more 
likely to remain in the informal sector, less likely to transition from the informal sector 
into the formal sector, and less likely to retain formal sector employment should they 
obtain it.  The informal sector can be characterized as a second-best alternative to formal 
employment – the returns to education are lower than in the formal sector (results not 
shown).  While only 19 percent of Whites in the informal sector remain there after six 
months, over 50 percent of Africans and Coloureds, and 43 percent of Indians do.  About 
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60 percent of Whites in the informal sector transition to the formal sector after six 
months; the corresponding figure for Coloureds and Indians is about 20 percent, and for 
Africans is below 10 percent.   
 
Table XXII 
BLACK AFRICAN State wave 7
State wave 6 N Retired NEA U/E disc U/E search Informal Formal Total
retired 753 66.75 15.76 3.71 2.2 9.94 1.65 100
NEA (broad definition 5,425 2.37 67.76 10.71 12.63 4.74 1.78 100
u/e discouraged 2,028 1.66 18.69 37.34 28.61 10.09 3.61 100
u/e searching 3,121 0.7 13.6 17.26 51.12 9.11 8.2 100
informal employed 2,196 3.33 11.71 8.78 13.48 53.02 9.68 100
formal employed 3,743 0.53 2.85 2.24 6.74 5.75 81.89 100
Total 17,266 4.22 28.12 13.18 20.66 12.95 20.87 100
COLOURED State wave 7
State wave 6 N Retired NEA U/E disc U/E search Informal Formal Total
retired 144 66.53 26.66 3.19 1.34 1.24 1.04 100
NEA (broad definition 924 4.89 65.81 4.18 13.63 2.66 8.83 100
u/e discouraged 177 0.23 21.89 22.58 34.35 11.4 9.55 100
u/e searching 378 0.9 14.57 11.73 45.1 11.66 16.04 100
informal employed 220 1.81 15.06 3.35 9.25 52.03 18.5 100
formal employed 1,311 1.14 3.6 1.18 4.36 4.52 85.2 100
Total 3,154 4.57 23.98 4.79 14.17 8.86 43.62 100
INDIAN/ASIAN State wave 7
State wave 6 N Retired NEA U/E disc U/E search Informal Formal Total
retired 26 66.34 17.12 0 8.48 2.89 5.16 100
NEA (broad definition 208 4.74 72.27 2.61 11 1.69 7.69 100
u/e discouraged 26 6.02 23.17 11.62 51.25 0 7.94 100
u/e searching 70 1.37 31.28 6.19 30.91 4.61 25.64 100
informal employed 19 0 17.59 6.08 11.49 43.53 21.31 100
formal employed 296 0.15 3.51 0.82 4.85 5.11 85.56 100
Total 645 4.25 26.51 2.44 11.65 4.85 50.3 100
WHITE State wave 7
State wave 6 N Retired NEA U/E disc U/E search Informal Formal Total
retired 142 76.63 13.17 1.02 0.35 0.59 8.24 100
NEA (broad definition 500 5.08 71.64 2.61 5.35 2.4 12.92 100
u/e discouraged 33 19.47 30.94 23.41 5.52 0 20.66 100
u/e searching 61 5.32 18.65 8.14 31.11 11.84 24.94 100
informal employed 61 2.06 13.41 0 6.32 18.79 59.42 100
formal employed 1,327 1.91 4.38 0.65 1.44 2.58 89.04 100
Total 2,124 8.34 20.57 1.68 3.37 3.18 62.87 100
 
Table XXIII shows the conditional probabilities of transition from the informal 
sector to the formal sector, controlling for the probabilities of remaining in the informal 
sector or transitioning to another employment status.13  For most groups, the informal 
sector does not seem to be a stepping stone into the formal sector.  Moreover, it 
                                                 
13 Results in table are a portion of the multinomial logit results.  We have controlled for the conditional 
probabilities of remaining in informal and transitioning from informal to NEA or unemployment. 
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reinforces already-existing inequalities: women are 7 percentage points less likely to 
transition than men, Whites are 31.5 percentage points more likely than Africans, and 
having some post-matric education increases the likelihood of making this transition by 
24 percentage points. 
 
Table XXIII 
Effect of covariates on probability of moving from













*province dummies were included, but results not shown
Note: Wave 6 to wave 7 transition
Note: mean derivatives presented with significance 
levels from mlogit (results from other categories excluded)  
 
The size of the outflow of African workers from the formal sector is large due to 
the combination of the relative size of the African population and the fact that African 
workers are proportionally less likely to retain a formal sector job than are other races.  In 
a six-month period, Whites are about 7 percentage points more likely than Africans to 
remain in the formal sector, while Coloureds and Indians are about 4 percentage points 
more likely than Africans to do so.  If we condition on gender, race, age, education level, 
urban/rural and whether the individual has held a job before, the gap between Whites and 
Africans is only reduced slightly to 5.5 percent (multinomial logit, results not shown). 
 Job search is more effective for Whites and Indians than it is for Africans and 
Coloureds.  Of those who are actively job searching, 50 percent of Africans and 45 
percent of Coloureds are still searching after six months, whereas only 30 percent of 
Whites and Indians remain in this state.  Africans are more likely to move from actively 
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searching to either discouraged or NEA than into employment, while the other population 
groups are more likely to move into employment in the formal sector or NEA than the 
other categories.  It is troubling that as much as 17 percent of Africans who are actively 
searching for a job transition into discouragement within six months.  This raises 
questions about the efficacy of various search methods and the reasons why so many 
Africans transition into discouragement. We deal with some of these questions in the 
multinomial logit analysis below. 
The proportion of discouraged workers in the labor force has been growing, with 
African workers comprising a larger portion of discouraged workers over time.14  
Discouraged worker status is a much more sticky employment status for Africans than for 
the other population groups: 50 percent remain discouraged six months later, while this 
figure is approximately 23 percent for Coloureds and Whites, and only 12 percent for 
Indians.  A troubling statistic is the  magnitude of the outflow of Africans from the 
formal sector directly into the discouraged worker category. 
 
4.1.3  Multinomial logit analysis of outflow from unemployment 
 
Policy interventions must address the current stock of unemployed and increase the 
outflow from unemployment either into employment or out of the labor force (i.e. into 
NEA).  We examine the current rate of outflow using a multinomial logit analysis to see 
if there are populations that could be targeted with policy (see Table XXIII).  These 
results confirm what is already apparent: urban residents, Africans and younger workers 
are less likely to make the transition from unemployment to employment (either formal 
or informal).  Searching while unemployed not only increases the probability of transition 
into employment, but it slightly decreases the probability of transition into NEA.  These 
results suggest that those who are searching are less likely to give up, those who have no 
easy “NEA” option are more likely to actually search.  In addition to being more likely to 
transition into employment, Whites and Indians are also more likely to transition into 
NEA, where they are no longer classified as unemployed even if they are not working.  
This increases the proportion of the unemployed over time who are African or Coloured.  
                                                 
14 LFS 2000-2005, Broad definition of unemployment 
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Each additional year of secondary education (without having a matric) reduces the 
probability of transition from unemployment into NEA by about 1.3 percent, which 




If the high rate of unemployment that we observe is the equilibrium rate, then it is 
unlikely to go down on its own without a policy intervention or substantial shock to the 
market.  Assuming that the first transition matrix in Table XVIII is the true transition 
matrix for the South African economy for this period, we can calculate the steady state it 
implies. In the steady state the share of the retired will be 5.4 percent, the share of those 
not economically active (NEA) is 24.7 percent, the share of those unemployed but 
discouraged is 10.8 percent, the share of those who are unemployed and searching is 18.3 
percent, the share of those informally employed is 11.7 percent and the rest, 29.1 percent 
are in the formal sector working. The corresponding fractions in the actual data are 4.7 
percent, 26.9 percent, 10.8 percent, 17.9 percent, 11.3 percent and 28.4 percent. In other 
words, the labor market is more or less already in the steady state. 
The results from this section suggest that the bulk of the unemployment is structural 
rather than transitional.  This does not of course mean that there are no transitional 
elements in what we observe. Nor should we conclude that the elements identified in this 
section, such as search costs, are unimportant. But if they play a role, it is not so much 
because the economy is in transition, but because they interact with other structural 
features of the economy. 
The huge amount of churning in the labor market presents two avenues for policy: 
increase the inflow into the formal sector and/or slow the outflow out of it.  As mentioned 
above, the labor market is very near the steady state so it is unlikely that the 
unemployment rate will fall without intervention or an external shock.  This evidence 
does not tell us whether these transitions out of the formal sector are voluntary quits or 
lay-offs (although anecdotal evidence suggests they are the former), but high turnover in 
the workforce generally leads to a sub-optimal level of investment in firm or industry-
specific human capital on the part of workers and the employers.  On the other hand, 
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workers seem to have a reasonable chance of finding jobs, but the large bi-directional 
flows may be hiding changes in the skill composition of the formal sector discussed in 
section 3.  If firms have been upgrading the skill level of their labor force as real wages 
remain stable, then we may have a more sclerotic labor market than it seems, as one set 




Search costs are an underlying reason why unemployment and the informal sector are 
more “sticky” labor market outcomes for some groups than for others.  As shown above, 
Africans and Coloureds are more likely to remain searching than Whites or Indians.  The 
differential effectiveness of search may be accounted for by the legacy of apartheid-era 
spatial separation.  The high turnover rates we see in the data reduce incentives on the 
part of employees and employers to invest a lot in the search process.  In a changing 
world there will always be people and jobs that are mismatched and efficiency demands 
that they be reallocated. While this could be achieved without creating unemployment 
(employers and employees could wait till they find new employees/jobs before effecting 
a separation) there are good and well-known reasons why this is not how it typically 
happens. For example, firms are likely to be reluctant to train people for jobs knowing 
that they will replaced soon and if employees have to find a job without quitting, this 
would place limits on how much time and travel they can put into the job search. 
The problem with this class of explanations is that people and firms everywhere need 
to search for jobs and employees and yet most places do not have the kind of 
unemployment we see in South Africa. There are however some potential reasons why 
search may be a bigger problem South Africa. First, the history of apartheid was a history 
of apartness.  Many Backs were banished to distant homelands, and only allowed to come 
to the “white” areas if they had a job. As a result, a substantial part of the African  
population of South Africa grew up far from the centers of business and industry. 
Moreover, given the poor infrastructure in these places, their often-inconvenient 
locations, and white beliefs about the (potentially insecure) nature of these places, 
unfounded or otherwise, it is unlikely that capital will move there en masse. Therefore, 
workers from these areas need to search for jobs far from their homes, and this is 
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typically a major discouragement. We know that even in an ultra-mobile society like the 
United States, most people prefer to stay where they were born even when wages are 
much higher elsewhere. So perhaps it is no surprise that a lot of people from the 
homelands elect to stay where their family lives and look for a job that they will not find, 
rather than stepping into some distant unknown world.  
To make matters worse, the lack of high-density urban centers makes South Africa 
very different from most middle-income countries. High-density centers make job search 
easy, in part because there are many opportunities close by, and in part because the 
density makes it possible to set up low cost public transportation systems. As a result, the 
physical costs of job search may be particularly high in South Africa, thereby reducing 
the effectiveness of the job search of a large group of the population and increasing the 
equilibrium unemployment rate. However, this was also true in the past, when 
unemployment appeared to be lower. There are two reasons why this might be more 
problematic now than in the past. One possibility is that in the past there were more jobs 
near the homelands in the primary sector and the loss of these jobs left the population in 
these areas residing further away from the new jobs without the possibility of moving 
closer to them because of apartheid. The other possibility is that because of the 
impossibility of search in the apartheid era, people in the homelands did not consider 
themselves unemployed (but rather NEA).  Now that apartheid is over, they do. 
The history of racial prejudice may be another reason why search is a particular 
problem in South Africa. Some white employers might have strong beliefs about what 
Africans can and cannot do, which might make them unwilling to give a chance to 
someone who is qualified. Knowing that such discrimination exists might also discourage 
Africans from searching. This in turn might discourage unprejudiced white employers 
from searching, since they know that they are unlikely to find someone good. Indeed as 
known from the work of Diamond (1984), search models admit multiple equilibria with 
differing levels of search, and a small amount of prejudice could tip the equilibrium 
towards the inefficient low search equilibrium (or shift the unique equilibrium towards 
the low search outcome).  
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Finally, unions may protect jobs to the point where very few people ever leave their 
jobs, which would mean that there are few openings and job search is frustratingly slow.  
The transitions data suggest this is not the case.    
High search costs could in principle explain high levels of transitional unemployment 
when combined with the fact that the demand and supply of labor in South Africa had 
shifted enormously during this period, making large reallocations necessary. High search 
costs would slow down this transition, though whether that increases or decreases 
unemployment depends on whether, on balance, this leads to more time spent searching.  
After all, firms and individuals could decide not to search and just make do with 
whatever employee or employer they currently have. 
 
4.3 Reservation wages 
 
 As documented in sections 2 and 4.1.2, unemployment is especially high among 
workers under the age of 35, and most of these unemployed young people have never 
worked before.  One possible interpretation of this phenomenon is that people claim that 
they want a job and are looking, but are really not, either because they are looking for a 
job that is not there (a job that would pay them a lot or one that is in their backyard) or 
because they are putting very little effort into their job searches (perhaps without quite 
realizing it). In other words, they are not looking for the job that they can get.  
Why might this be a particular problem in South Africa? One answer is that South 
Africa’s social pension program is particularly generous, paying each senior South 
African something of the order twice the per capita income. No other middle-income 
country has a comparable program. This is a result of extending the very generous 
apartheid- era pension program for Whites to the rest of the population.  
 
4.3.1  Pensions and reservation wages 
 
One consequence of this program is that many unemployed South Africans can 
survive without having to take a job, as long as their elders are willing to support them. 
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This would mean that they might put less effort into job search and be fussier about jobs 
they take.  
There is some evidence that this is indeed a problem. Bertrand et al., using data from 
the mid 1990s, show evidence that people who have family members who are eligible for 
the pension tend to work less than they would otherwise.  Bertrand et al., though, rely 
entirely on cross-sectional evidence and use data that precedes the start of the LFS 
surveys that we have used in this paper.  More recent (and perhaps more convincing) 
evidence is provided by Ranchhod (2006).  His paper analyzes the change in employment 
and labor force participation rates using the panel components in the LFS. We 
incorporate results taken verbatim from a draft version of a recent paper presented at the 
Population Association of America.  In Table XXIV, Ranchhod presents the coefficient 
estimates from several different regressions. The coefficient reported corresponds to a 
dummy variable that indicates whether the household is a Keeper or a Loser. The 
objective of this table was to investigate whether households experience other changes 
that correlate with the departure of the pensioner. 
 
Table XXIV: "Difference in Difference" estimates of the effect of the loss of a pensioner 
 Regression coefficients where dependent variable is the change in composition 
Dependent Variable All Areas Rural Areas Urban Areas 
 Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
HH size -0.872 [0.061]*** -0.878 [0.075]*** -0.853 [0.103]*** 
# kids young -0.061 [0.027]** -0.07 [0.036]* -0.036 [0.037] 
# kids school -0.052 [0.027]* -0.039 [0.037] -0.07 [0.037]* 
# youth -0.022 [0.021] -0.032 [0.027] -0.008 [0.033] 
# adults 0.331 [0.035]*** 0.336 [0.041]*** 0.324 [0.065]*** 
# adult M 0.094 [0.024]*** 0.075 [0.028]*** 0.127 [0.043]*** 
# adult F 0.238 [0.025]*** 0.26 [0.030]*** 0.196 [0.045]*** 
       
Note:       
1. Taken from Ranchhod V. "Household responses to adverse income shocks: 
Pensioner out-migration and mortality in South Africa" 
2. Only the coefficient on the interaction term is reported.    
3. Paper available via email: vranchho@umich.edu    
4. Each entry is a regression coefficient from a different regression   
5. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the household level   
6. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
7. Coefficients correspond to the estimate on the `LosePen' variable   
8. Omitted controls include province dummies, initial household size and number of pensioners 
9. In the ``All areas'' regression, an `urban' dummy variable was also included.  
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The coefficients indicate that the loss of a pensioner correlates negatively with the 
number of dependents in the household (children and youth), and positively with the 
number of adults in the household. Indeed, the coefficient of 0.331 in the adults 
regression suggests that, on average, Loser households experience an increase of 0.331 
adults more than Keeper households, in a six month period. This suggests that household 
formation is sensitive to pension income. 
Table XXV below is of greater interest to our puzzle. It has been argued before that 
the Old Age Pension results in labor force withdrawal by the adult children of the 
pensioners (Bertrand et al., 2003). In this table, the author investigates whether the loss of 
a pensioner generates a corresponding increase in labor force participation. He also tests 
whether there are adverse effects on youth that forces them to drop out of school in order 
to find work. 
These results suggest that, of the youth and children who remain in the Loser 
households, there is little statistical evidence to indicate that such adverse effects are 
experienced. What is very interesting and important is that he finds an increase in 
employment rates amongst adults, particularly adult women, of between 5 and 6 
percentage points. In the high unemployment context already described, this is a large 
and economically important increase. This might also explain the particular age structure 
of unemployment—perhaps people start looking seriously for a job when their parents die 
(or are dying), which is why people above thirty are more likely to be employed. People 
above thirty are also much more likely to be married and/or have children, which might 
also make it harder for them to depend on their parents.  
These results should be treated with some caution. First, the estimated effect might be 
a severe underestimate, since many people who do not live with pension-receivers may 
nevertheless depend on them economically. On the other side, households may lose 
pensioners precisely because someone in the household has now found a job, and the 
pensioner is now less needed (so she might move back to her home, for example). This 
would lead to an overestimate. Indeed when Ranchhod tries to look at the same question 
using deaths of potential pension-receivers, he does not find an effect, though this could 
easily be because he does not have enough data.  
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Finally, there may be a counter-balancing impact of pension receipts that leads to 
increased job search.  Pension income may make it affordable for household members, 
and in particular women, to migrate in order to search for jobs.  Research by Posel, 
Fairburn & Lund (2004) and Edmonds, Mammen & Miller (2003), for example, suggests 
that pension receipt facilitates the departure of prime-age women from the household to 
permit them to migrate in search of work.  Hence, the ways in which the pension interact 
with the labor market in South Africa are nuanced. 
 
Table XXV: "Difference in Difference" estimates of the effect of the loss of a pensioner 
Regression coefficients where dependent variable is the change in Activity 
Dependent Variable All Areas Rural Areas Urban Areas 
 Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Prop. kids schl -0.002[0.005] 0[0.006] -0.007[0.009] 
Prop. youth schl 0.018[0.016] 0.023[0.019] 0.004[0.027] 
Prop. youth inLF (n) -0.01[0.015] -0.03[0.017]* 0.03[0.027] 
Prop. youth Work 0.003[0.009] -0.001[0.012] 0.014[0.013] 
Prop. adult inLF (n) -0.003[0.013] -0.001[0.017] -0.009[0.021] 
Prop. adult inLF (b) -0.042[0.011]*** -0.042[0.016]*** -0.042[0.015]*** 
Prop. adults work 0.057[0.011]*** 0.059[0.014]*** 0.053[0.018]*** 
Prop. adult M in LF (n) -0.017[0.018] -0.003[0.024] -0.038[0.027] 
Prop. adult F in LF (n) 0.009[0.017] -0.003[0.022] 0.03[0.027] 
Prop. adult M in LF (b) -0.049[0.014]*** -0.036[0.019]* -0.065[0.021]*** 
Prop. adult F in LF (b) -0.026[0.015]* -0.039[0.020]* -0.003[0.021] 
Prop. adult men work  0.029[0.016]* 0.036[0.021]* 0.016[0.026] 
Prop. adult women work 0.058[0.014]*** 0.059[0.018]*** 0.058[0.023]** 
       
Note:       
1. Taken from Ranchhod V. "Household responses to adverse income shocks: 
Pensioner out-migration and mortality in South Africa" 
2. Only the coefficient on the interaction term is reported.    
3. Paper available via email: vranchho@umich.edu    
4. Each entry is a regression coefficient from a different regression   
5. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the household level   
6. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
7. Coefficients correspond to the estimate on the `LosePen' variable   
8. Omitted controls include province dummies, initial household size and number of pensioners 
9. In the ``All areas'' regression, an `urban' dummy variable was also included.  
 
 
4.3.2  Education, expectations,  and reservation wages 
 
Another reason why South Africa is different from many other countries is that there 
has been an enormous transformation of the structure of the labor force over the last 15 
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years. The implementation of the compulsory schooling laws has meant that almost all of 
the younger workers now have 10 years or so of education, whereas many of those who 
grew up under apartheid only had a few years of education. This means that the return to 
schooling and the benefits of having matriculated have probably fallen substantially. If 
the newly educated workers have not yet understood this, they may be holding out for 
jobs that are no longer going to be available to them. This may be why younger workers 
and especially matriculates among them have done so badly in recent years in terms of 
employment.  
 
4.3.3  Employment attitudes and reservation wages  
 
Despite the general plausibility of a high reservation wage being a constraint a 
number of scholars have argued against this possibility. One reason, cited by Kingdon 
and Knight (2003), is that the unemployed are less happy and poorer than the informally 
employed, but this could reflect underlying differences between these two populations. 
In the LFS waves, all persons who were not working in the past seven days were 
asked why they were not working. We pooled the data from waves 6 to 11 to generate 
Table XXVI below. It shows the mean responses by various age groups. The earlier 
waves were omitted as the question differed slightly.  Reservation wages do not seem to 
be an important part of the story.   
As expected, amongst younger people an important reason for not working is to 
study. However, from the ages of 20 to 50, the most common reason provided is that 
people cannot find any work. Indeed, from age 20 to 40, over half of the respondents 
chose this category. Note that this is not that they cannot find suitable work, in terms of 
“salary, location or work conditions”, as this was captured by a separate question that is 
included in the ‘Other’ column in the table. Taken by itself it argues against the 
reservation wages view, but is not clear that we can infer from these answers that they 
have seriously looked for and not found a job.  
With age, the reasons indicated for not working change. We thus observe that older 
cohorts are more likely to be NEA in order to be homemakers, or be retired. The 
importance of health reasons as we move up the age profile is striking. The data is fairly 
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limited on the specific types of health problems that preclude a person from working, and 
health itself is likely to be a function of poverty and prior work conditions. Regardless of 
the underlying cause, health is an important component in a person’s productivity, and 
more than a quarter of those not employed in their fifties claim that poor health is the 
problem. Understanding and treating these problems may contribute significantly to 
greater labor force participation amongst middle aged South Africans. From the ages of 
60 upwards, the vast majority of this sub-population have retired, which is the age at 
which people start to receive the state Old Age Pension. 
 
Table XXVI: Of those not working, why are they not working, by age group? (%)   






ANY work Other 
15 – 19 67,564 0.8 81.33 0.56 1.05 2.03 10.65 3.59 
20 – 24 45,906 2.08 29.16 0.19 2.37 7.43 51.01 7.75 
25 – 29 27,342 5.1 4.29 0.15 4.59 9.12 67.98 8.78 
30 – 34 20,173 9.5 1.14 0.15 7.27 8.12 64.12 9.69 
35 – 39 15,629 14.26 0.48 0.46 11.48 7.14 56.87 9.31 
40 – 44 14,311 15.54 0.2 1.71 17.44 6.19 48.96 9.94 
45 – 49 12,063 18.9 0.2 3.64 22.96 5 39.72 9.59 
50 – 54 11,916 18.4 0.15 16.21 27.42 3.07 26.49 8.26 
55 – 59 10,622 15.24 0.07 31.3 26.92 1.77 17.65 7.05 
60 – 64 12,641 6.1 0.06 76.12 10.82 0.28 3.97 2.67 
65 – 69 11,000 3.2 0.1 89.87 4.6 0.1 1.22 0.92 
Total 249,167 6.54 27.77 9.5 7.63 5.04 36.79 6.74 





 Our analysis of transitions demonstrates that there is a lot of churning going on in 
the labor market.  We suspect there is selective churning: the characteristics of workers in 
the inflow to and outflow from the formal sector, for example, are likely not identical.  
However we are unable to capture the nature of the sorting with the demographic 
variables we included in our analysis.  Transition from the informal sector to the formal 
sector is more likely for more advantaged groups (Whites, men, those with more 
education).  This evidence suggests that in addition to the skill-composition changes 
documented in section 2, employers may be more selective along other dimensions of 
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quality (experience, for example) that put the currently unemployed at even more of a 
disadvantage. 
 Despite the high rate of transition, many young workers don’t transition into the 
labor force and instead remain unemployed (discouraged or searching) for long periods of 
time.  The inability or unwillingness of these workers to enter the labor force and obtain 
their first job suggests an important role of high search costs, compounded by high 
turnover in the labor market (which reduces the incentive to invest in search), and of high 




Conclusion   
 
We noted at the outset that changes in the unemployment rate can be viewed as 
resulting from either a temporary shock or a more permanent structural change.  We 
proceeded by using several nationally representative household surveys to investigate 
multiple aspects of South African unemployment.  On the more aggregate level, we noted 
that the demand for unskilled labor had fallen and that this was particularly manifested in 
the agricultural and mining sectors.   Concurrent with the decline in the demand for less-
skilled labor, there was a large increase in the supply of less skilled labor.  Much of this 
increase was in the form of a large influx of African women into the labor market.  The 
result of the increased supply and decreased demand was, predictably, increased 
unemployment.   
 While unemployment represents lost potential at both the personal and societal 
levels, it should be noted that the large influx of African women into the labor market 
which contributed to the unemployment may, in and of itself, not be a bad thing.  If these 
women were previously not economically active because they perceived that the labor 
market provided no opportunities to them, then their entrance into the labor market is 
economically hopeful.  It increases potential output.  This is a “pull” story—the women 
are pulled into the labor market.   If the increase in African women into the labor market 
is a “push” story, the implications are more dire.  This would be the case if women are 
entering the labor force (and not finding jobs) because their economic circumstances 
dictate it.  If, for example, spouses or partners have lost their jobs and/or fallen ill, and 
women are being forced into the labor market in order to support themselves and their 
families, the increased participation rate is in fact bad news.  At this point, the “push” 
versus “pull” story is an open question and one that deserves further study.  Our analysis 
simply notes that the increase in African female labor supply is one reason that, as the 
title asks, unemployment has increased in the new South Africa.   
Be it “push” or “pull”, we view this massive influx of female labor supply as a 
structural change, not a temporary shock.  There is simply no evidence to suggest that 
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women are likely to exit the labor market in the sort of numbers that entered any time 
soon.  Similarly, there is little reason to expect that mining is likely to become more labor 
intensive.  Capital has substituted for labor for some technical reasons (e.g. the mines are 
getting so deep that machines are needed rather than humans).  Mining is subject to 
demand shocks as are most commodity-based industries.  However, the fact that mining 
employment has fallen rather steadily during the recent commodity boom leads us to 
believe that the decline in mining employment is also a structural shift rather than a 
transitory shock.  Finally, the decline in agricultural employment also strikes us as a 
structural shift.  The South African economy has moved into sectors such as financial 
services and other service sectors, and agriculture is on the downswing. 
 In section 3, we noted that there have been important compositional changes in 
employment at the sectoral level.  In particular, the pool of the employed has tended to 
become more skilled while the less skilled have more often become relegated to the ranks 
of the unemployed.  This is a global phenomenon and is in no way unique to South 
Africa.  Many economists attribute these sectoral changes to technical change that biases 
labor demand toward more skilled workers.  The structural shift of skill-biased technical 
change has impacted South Africa at an especially inopportune time, for it tends to 
amplify the unemployment consequences of the increase in labor supply of unskilled 
workers. 
Section 4 turned more closely to the individual-level evidence and explored how 
workers have adjusted (or not) to the changing labor market that is highlighted in sections 
2 and 3.  There we found that simply examining the employed/unemployed dichotomy is 
too simple.  Among the employed, it matters if one is in the formal or informal sector and 
among the unemployed, the actively searching versus discouraged worker distinction 
matters a great deal to outcomes.  We examined the likelihood of transitions from one 
labor market status to another, and the results are especially informative for policy.  For 
example, the data indicate that there is substantial entry into and exit from the informal 
sector, but transitions are typically to some form of unemployment or lack of labor 
market participation.  Transitions from the informal sector to the formal sector are 
surprisingly rare.  The transitions results are especially stark when it comes to youth.  
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Obtaining that first job is crucial to future involvement in the labor market.  It is also 
exceedingly difficult for many, and simply having a matric degree is of little help.   
 The results in section 4 illustrate how the labor market can be viewed as having 
two pieces.  In one piece, there is the formal labor market and once one is in it, one has a 
very good chance of staying in it.  The other piece is a mix of those searching for 
employment, those discouraged, those who have declared themselves not economically 
active, and those employed in the informal sector.  Within this chunk of the labor market, 
there is substantial dynamism, but none of the labor market statuses in this category are 
very economically attractive.   
 Given that there is persistence in this second part of the labor market and that 
these outcomes are associated with low incomes, we ask how individuals cope.  One 
important policy mechanism is the old age pension.  We find that a presumably 
unintended consequence of this important social insurance policy is that it may 
discourage some individuals from seeking or taking a job that, in the absence of a 
pensioner in the household, the individual might seek or take.  On the other hand, this 
policy may be part of the reason that South Africa has been able to withstand persistent 
high unemployment rates with relatively little social unrest. 
One “wait it out” strategy is to let inflation lower real wages until the labor market 
clears.  While possibly unintentional, this policy has been in effect.  Inflation has been 
moderate but nominal wages have somewhat stagnated in the second half of the 1990’s, 
leading to stable or declining real wages.  The persistence of high unemployment even 
while real wages were declining suggests that: a) unemployment would have been even 
higher absent the inflation; and b) the very moderate inflation has been insufficient to 
clear the labor market. 
While we find that most of the reasons for the rise of unemployment in the new South 
Africa are structural (other such structural reasons include the legacies of the education 
system and the disconnect between where the jobs are and where people live), there is 
still a crucial role for policy intervention.  Indeed, because most of the reasons for 
unemployment are structural, policy is especially needed.  Simply waiting for the positive 
“shock” to counter the negative one is unlikely to be fruitful.  
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Neither do we believe that macroeconomic policy is likely to solve the unemployment 
problem.  Were unemployment the result of a temporary easing of demand, this might 
make sense, but, as noted above, our analysis points to more structural causes of the rise 
in unemployment. 
We have restricted ourselves in this paper to analysis that is supported by the data.  
An implication of this research strategy is that we have not engaged in much “big think” 
speculation on what might solve the unemployment dilemma.  Some constraints are 
especially prominent and deserve policy consideration.  One of these is the hurdle of 
school-leavers obtaining their first job.  There are several policy options including a wage 
subsidy, a search subsidy, reduced regulations for first jobs, and government 
employment.  Another constraint is the mismatch between where the unemployed live 
and where formal sector jobs reside.  Here policy options include transportation 
subsidies, housing policy, business location policy, and infrastructure investment, among 
others.  Yet another constraint is the mismatch between the skill set of the unemployed 
and the skills required in the labor market.  But in the longer run, this mismatch can be 
eased with sound policy.  Options here include educational reform, training programs, 
and training subsidies.  At this point our analysis is simply insufficient to distinguish 
between the many options that might plausibly ease each constraint.  Rather, we advocate 
a cautious approach that includes a focus on experimentation.  Understanding why 
unemployment has risen in the new South Africa is akin to diagnosing the illness; the 
next step is finding the right medicine. We believe that much can be learned from 
smaller-scale interventions that are well-designed and which are accompanied by careful 
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Description of the data 
 
The results in Section 4 are based on individual-level data primarily from waves 4 
through 9 of the South African Labour Force Surveys (LFSs), as released by Statistics 
South Africa. The surveys are conducted bi-annually, with the first wave in February or 
March, and the second wave in September of each year.  From September 2002 (wave 4) 
to March 2003 (wave 9), the sample involved a rotating panel design, with 20 percent of 
respondents being rotated out between waves.15 Thus, between wave 4 and wave 5, 80 
percent of respondents were kept in the sample, and a new 20 percent were included. This 
continued through each wave until Wave 9, with the exception that no one was rotated 
out between Wave 5 and Wave 6.  Matching respondents across time was a complex and 
time consuming task, because the LFSs were not originally designed to be used as a 
panel.  Considerable effort on the part of Statistics South Africa provided us with a panel 
of individuals who were matched between two or more cross-sectional waves.  We are 
confident that the matching and editing process provides us with a good estimate of 
transition patterns in the data, and that the majority of the transitions are genuine and not 
an artifact of poor matching.16  The cross-sectional sample size is approximately 30,000 
households with about 100,000 individual observations; the panel sample size ranges 
between 45,000 and 71,000 (see Table A-1). 
The sampling method used is that of a stratified clustered random sample which 
results in each wave being a nationally representative cross-section of the country’s 
population. Each wave comes with a set of sampling weights, which we used in 
generating all of our results. The weights correct for potential over-sampling of certain 
                                                 
15 With the exception of the transition estimates, we have treated all observations as coming from 
independently drawn samples. 
16 Details of data processing can be found in Statistics South Africa’s document entitled “Stats SA Labour 
Force Panel Study Methodology Document”. 
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sub-populations, as well as for differential rates of non-response.17  Additionally, we use 
inverse probability weighting to correct for differential selection into the panel. 
The primary sampling unit of the survey is a dwelling, not a family or an individual.  
The surveys do not follow people who changed their residence, nor do they keep track of 
mortality or births. This selection is not trivial, and our estimates are unbiased only 




Date Wave Sample size
Sept 2001 4 60,639 
March 2002 5 71,153 
Sept 2002 6 68,050 
March 2003 7 66,825 
Sept 2003 8 58,756 
March 2004 9 45,856 
 
 
                                                 
17 To the extent that such non-response is not related to any variables of interest, such a correction will 
yield asymptotically unbiased estimates. 
18 We have not performed any tests or corrections for non-random attrition. 
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